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Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel
for Indigent Criminal Defendants
Economic obstacles often prevent indigent defendants from
securing adequate investigatory services, from obtaining
those witnesses who might be needed for an effective defense, and from utilizing other assistance beyond an attorney that is used by more affluent defendants in criminal
cases. After describing the severity of this problem, the
author of this Note evaluates the argumentsfor and against
the establishment of a constitutional right to aid in addition to counsel. He concludes that such a right is inferrable from either the due process clause, the equal protection clause, or the guarantees of counsel. The establishment of this right, however, would present significant
problems in determining those forms of aid most useful
to the defendant and within the economic ability of the
states to furnish.
INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, the problem of defining the scope of the
indigent's right to counsel' has engaged the attention and challenged the wisdom of legal scholars.' With the recent overruling
of Betts v. Brady'-which had declared that whether a state was
required to furnish counsel depended upon an evaluation of the
"totality of facts"-and the establishment of a seemingly unqualified right to counsel,4 an end to this long controversy may appear to some to be in sight.5 Yet a few, perhaps farseeing jurists
1. The landmarks in the development of the right to counsel are Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel in capital cases); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel in all federal felony
cases); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (whether failure to appoint
counsel violates fourteenth amendment due process depends on an appraisal
of the "totality of facts"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(overruling Betts v. Brady and holding that representation of counsel is
essential to a fair trial).
2. See, e.g., BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS

(1955); FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 112-27 (1958); Allen, The
Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DE PAUL L. REV. 213 (1959); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of

an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962); The Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1961).
3. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. The Court's overruling of Betts does not resolve the entire question,
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see the problem of providing aid to the indigent defendant as involving more than a right to the assistance of counsel;6 they argue
that the due process clause, the equal protection clause, or the guarantee of counsel itself may entitle an indigent defendant to various
forms of aid other than counsel in investigating, preparing, and
presenting his defense.7 Such assistance might include, for example, payment of fees to secure the assistance of expert witnesses
in preparing the defense or payment of investigatory costs to

locate important missing witnesses. Frequently, such assistance may
be more important than counsel. An accountant may be more

helpful than an attorney to a person accused of tax fraud, while a
handwriting expert could be more essential than a criminal lawyer
to a person charged with forgery.
for the Court has not fully defined the scope of the accused's right to
counsel. It has said only that "any person . . . cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963). A vast problem in "drawing the line"' remains unresolved.
There are at least two dimensions to this problem. The first involves a
determination of the kinds of cases-juvenile proceedings, petty offenses,
misdemeanors, felonies-to which the right to -counsel extends. See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due
Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 260-72 (1962). The second is to
determine at what stages in the legal process counsel is required. See
Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771
(1961); Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, id. at
783; Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the PenoCorrectional Process, id. at 803. An independent problem is whether an expansion of the right to counsel is to be retroactively applied. See Kamisar,
supra at 272-81. Evaluation of these problems is beyond the scope of this
Note except as such evaluation is relevant to determining the existence
of a constitutional right to aid other than counsel.
6. See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 111-16 (7th Cir. 1957)
(Duffy, C.J., Finnegan, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d
565, 567-74 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting); United States ex rel.
Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 549-69 (3d Cir. 1951) (Biggs, CJ., dissenting), affd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
7. One of the most forceful statements in support of this position is that
of the late Judge Frank:
Furnishing . . . [the defendant] with a lawyer is not enough: The
best lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an accused person
if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense,
e. g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a
pivotal missing witness or a necessary document, or that of an expert
accountant or mining engineer or chemist. It might, indeed, reasonably be argued that for the government to defray such expenses, which
the indigent accused cannot meet, is essential to that assistance by
counsel which the Sixth Amendment guarantees. Legal aid has no
money available for that purpose, nor, in most jurisdictions, does the
Public Defender (if there is one). In such circumstances, if the government does not supply the funds, justice is denied the poor-and
represents but an upper-bracket privilege.
United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting

opinion).
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Twelve years ago, in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,s a majority of the Third Circuit could see little merit in the contention that an indigent defendant had a constitutional right to the
assistance of a psychiatrist, paid for by the state, in preparing his
defense.

[V]e have great difficulty in accepting as a proposition of constitu-

tional law that one accused of crime is entitled to receive at public expense all the collateral assistance needed to make his defense ....
The same argument . . . would entitle [the accused] to consultation
with ballistic experts, chemists, engineers, biologists, or any type of expert whose help in a particular case might be relevant. We do not
think the requirements of due process go so far.9

Today the claim that the indigent accused is constitutionally entitled to aid other than counsel appears much less bizarre." Only
this term, the Supreme Court of the United States heard argument
that the petitioner had a constitutional right to the services of an
independent psychiatrist, to be provided by the state." Because
defendant might have been insane at the time of the crime, the
state agreed to a retrial and the Court postponed evaluation of
the constitutional argument.
Recent developments in the field of criminal procedure make
the establishment of a right to aid other than counsel distinctly
possible. In the last decade, the establishment and advancement
of legal aid systems 2 has resulted in substantial improvements in
8. 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1951).
9. Id. at 547.
10. The Eighth Circuit in 1961 indicated that the Government will provide handwriting experts for a defendant if he complies with FED. R.
CRIM. P. 17(b). Bandy v. United States, 296 F.2d 882, 888 (8th Cir.
1961).
11. Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963). Petitioner argued that psychiatric examination is the only satisfactory procedure for determining sanity
and pointed to the widespread statutory recognition that such aid is essential to a fair trial. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 18-29.
The federal courts and courts in 23 states provide psychiatric examination where insanity is an issue. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1301 (Supp. 1961); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1027; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-2(1) (Supp. 1961); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5142(c) (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(a) (1961); HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 258-36 (1955); KY. REV. STAT. § 203.340(1) (1962); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 27, § 118 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 7 (1957);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 100A (Supp. 1962); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2575.5 (Supp. 1962); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17 (1955); N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 658; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-91 (Supp. 1961);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40
(Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 60 (Supp. 1962); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 1222 (1954); S.C. CODE § 32-969 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-513(5) (Supp. 1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-17 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4803 (1959); Wis. STAT. § 957.27 (1961); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 7-241 (1959).
12. See BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 10-15 (Supp.
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providing assistance to indigent defendants. In Congress, legislation intended to provide more adequate assistance to the accused
has been repeatedly introduced.' In 1963, the attorneys general
of 22 states joined in asking the Supreme Court to expand the
right to counsel in state criminal cases."' Within the past 12 years,
a constitutionally based right to aid in addition to counsel was unsuccessfully asserted in three federal court cases 5 with sufficient
persuasiveness to secure the support of six judges. In 1956, the
Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Illinois, discussed the due process

and equal protection clauses in language broad enough to support, perhaps unintentionally, a constitutional right to aid in addition to counsel when it said: "there can be no equal justice where

the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he

has."' 6 Again in 1963, the Court, in Douglas v. California,"1 ap1961); Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MINN.
L. REV.715, 727-32 (1961); Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, id. at 737,
749-52. In the District of Columbia, a modem defender system was recently established to remedy a significant indigent problem. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 2-2201 (1961); see BAR ASS'N OF D.C., REPORT OF THE CoMMISSION ON LEGAL AID 90-127, 132-37 (1958). The Committee on Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime of the American Bar Foundation is presently engaged in a state-by-state audit of representation of
indigent persons.
13. The bills introduced in Congress during the current session are:
S. 1057, H.R. 4461, H.R. 4816, H.R. 5330, H.R. 5545, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1963). For a description and evaluation of recent proposed legislation, see Celler, Federal Legislative Proposals To Supply Paid Counsel to
Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 45 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1961).
The report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Criminal Justice calls for federal legislation authorizing
"the utilization of services essential to the proper conduct of the defense,
including investigatory services, the assistance of experts, transcripts of the
proceedings, and the like." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrTEE, REPORT ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINSTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 40
(1963) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE ON POVERTY].
In some nations, very liberal assistance is granted the accused, whether
indigent or not. In Scandinavian countries, for example:
not only is every accused in a criminal case entitled to counsel of his
own choosing at government expense, but counsel for every defendant
can call on government officials, at government expense, to make all
necessary investigations . . . and to supply analyses of handwriting

as well as expert testimony on behalf of the defendant.
FRANK, NOT GUILTY 87 (1957), see COMMrrTEE ON POVERTY 31-33.
14. Brief for the State Government as Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

15. United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957) (assistance
of accountant in a tax case); United States ex rel. Smith v. Badi, 192
F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951) (psychiatrist as expert witness); McGarty v.
O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951) (psychiatrist).
16. 351 U.S 12, 19 (1956).
17. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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peared to read the equal protection clause as casting upon the
states some duty to minimize the disadvantages resulting from the
defendant's poverty:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man . . . enjoys the benefit of counsel's examina-

tion into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments in his behalf, while the indigent . . . is forced to shift for himself.' 8

The Douglas case appears to be substantial support for a constitutional right to aid other than counsel. The Court there held that
the state must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant on his first
appeal. Although the Constitution does not guarantee the right
to appeal and although the defendant was not precluded, by
lack of counsel, from prosecuting his appeal, the Court argued that
counsel on appeal is necessary to achieve some degree of equality
between indigent defendants and defendants of means. The same
reasoning is equally persuasive as support for a constitutional right
to aid other than counsel at the trial level.
The purpose of this Note is to determine whether, in the light
of those developments in criminal procedure, an indigent defendant may now assert a constitutional right to aid in addition to
counsel. The Note will attempt, first, to establish that there is a
substantial need for aid other than counsel; second, to demonstrate that several clauses of the constitution could support the indigent defendant's right to such aid; and, third, to consider the
difficulties inherent in an attempt to provide this aid.
I.

THE NEED FOR AID IN ADDITION TO COUNSEL

The question of whether a constitutional right to aid other than
counsel exists certainly cannot be resolved merely by demonstrating the need for such aid and the inadequacy of present methods of
assisting indigent defendants. Such a background is useful, however, both to illustrate the significance of the problem and to provide a basis for determining the scope of the right, assuming it is
found to be constitutionally based.
Several factors are responsible for the growing need of the accused for aid in addition to counsel. The most obvious is that a
high percentage of criminal defendants are indigent. A survey in
Utah, for example, disclosed that one-half of all defendants in
that state were unable even to afford counsel.' 9 A more ex18. Id. at 357-58.
19. Kadish & Kimball, Legal Representation of the Indigent in Criminal Cases in Utah, 4 UTAH L. REV. 198, 214 (1954). For a discussion of
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tensive study estimated that in 1947, sixty percent of all defendants in the United States lacked the funds to employ counsel.'
In that year, 97,000 defendants in serious criminal cases could not
pay for counsel; 58,000 of these were assisted by volunteer or

public defender organizations, but the remaining 39,000 went without any aid. While substantial progress has been made in the past
15 years in the number of legal aid and public defender organizations, the percentage of people in the United States for whom no
legal aid exists has risen from 21.8 percent to 34.4 percent."1

Although indigent defendants may not always need aid in addition to counsel, a defendant who is unable to afford counsel will
probably be unable to finance any other aid he does need for his

defense. Even the defendant of modest means may be forced to
choose between employing counsel and financing other aid that
may be essential in the trial to his case.'

A second factor contributing to the need for aid is the increasing costliness of the legal process itself. Both counsel fees and

out-of-pocket expenses for discovery and for securing witnesses
have greatly increased.3 Indeed, one commentator suggests that

in all but the simplest cases the costs of preparation and counsel
the seriousness of the indigency problem in rural areas, see W'licox &
Bloustein, Account of a Field Study in a Rural Area of the Representation
of Indigents Accused of Crime, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 567 (1959).
20. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 83-84 (1951); see
FELLMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 125; N.Y. BAR AsS'N, SPECIAL COMM.
To STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEMS, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 80,
134-35 (1959) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. BAR COMM. STUDY]; Kennedy, Judicial Administration:Fair and Equal Treatment to All Before the Law, 28
VITAL SPEECHES 706 (1962); Pollock, supra note 12, at 738-39. The Attorney General's Committee has concluded that at the present time, over
one-third of federal defendants are financially unable to obtain competent
counsel. COMMITTEE ON POVERTY 16-17.
21. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (Supp. 1961).
22. The bail problem is an example of the adverse consequences of relative indigency. See generally Ares & Sturz, Bail and the Indigent Accused,
8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 12, 14-15 (1962); Foote, Comment on the New
York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 689-92 (1958); Maas, Robert
Kennedy Speaks Out, Look, March 28, 1961, p. 24; Samuels, Bail: Justice
for FarFrom All, New York Times, Aug. 19, 1962, § 6 (Magazine), p. 13.
If the defendant is unable to provide bail or if he chooses to use his
limited resources for counsel rather than for bail, he must remain incarcerated at the time that it is most vital for him to be free to secure witnesses
or to assist his attorney in gathering information for his defense. See CoMMrrITEE ON POVERTY 70-72; Note, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 725 (1958).
In addition, if the defendant is employed, his financial support will be cut
off, leaving him with no means to finance assistane that his case may Tequire.
23. Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 832, 834 (1958); see Brand, The Impact
of the Increased Cost of Litigation, 35 J. AM. JUD. SoC'Y 102 (1951).
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"will ruin the ordinary man."24 Likewise, the burdens on legal
aid organizations and private volunteer counsels are increasing.2
Perhaps more significantly, the number of defendants who may
be considered "indigent" is also rising; a defendant who has suf-

ficient funds to secure aid in a relatively simple, brief trial may
become indigent in the process of defending himself in a more
complicated proceeding.2 6 The result of the rising cost of litigation is not only that an indigent defendant cannot afford a proper
defense,2" but also that the defendant of modest means may secure
representation that is casual, at best.2

The criminal defendant may require aid in paying witness

fees, printing expenses, and discovery costs.29 Inability to finance these expenses has led, with some frequency, to convictions later found to be erroneous." A vivid example is Bush v.
Texas," where the state repeatedly rejected the defendant's plea
for the services of a psychiatrist. Not until the defendant had
been convicted and his appeal had been carried to the United
States Supreme Court did the state recognize that the defendant

may have been prejudiced by its refusal to furnish a psychia-

trist. 2 Perhaps even more serious than the need for witnesses is
the problem of securing information on which to construct a defense. Defense counsel contend that this is their chief problem 3
24. Cross, "The Assistance of Counsel for His Defense": Is This
Becoming a Meaningless Guarantee?, 38 A.B.A.J. 995, 996 (1952).
25. See generally N.Y. BAR COMM. STUDY 34-53; Trebach, A Modern
Defender System for New Jersey, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 289 (1957).
26. See Cross, supra note 24, at 996.
27. See Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in
the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 581, 589 (1963); Note,
Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public
Defender and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522, 552-55
(1961).
28. See FRANK, NOT GUILTY 88-89 (1957). For example, the assigned
counsel system may tend to encourage guilty pleas because the unpaid
attorney has an interest in avoiding the further expense of a trial. Note,
76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 597-98 (1963).
29. See Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 832, 833 (1958).
30. See BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 28, 50, 190, 197, 342

(1932); FRANK, NOT GUILTY 75, 84, 85, 196 (1957).
31. 372 U.S. 586 (1963).
32. For comments on the defendant's need for a psychiatrist, see United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 570-71 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061-63 (1962);
Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases,
48 MICH. L. REV. 961, 975 (1950); Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-18, Bush
v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963).
33. See the comments of Harris B. Steinberg of the New York Bar and
Si Weisman of the Minnesota Bar in ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE PROBLEM OF A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 3-5, 35-37
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and that "money is the chief obstacle to getting at information.""4
Moreover, the limited discovery procedures available to a criminal
defendant 5 are not very helpful in securing this information."
The need for aid in addition to counsel is heightened by the
inadequacy of present systems of aiding indigent defendants. Legal assistance for indigents in the United States has long been inadequate.37 Both private voluntary organizations and assigned
counsel systems lack adequate funds to compensate the lawyers
who participate and to finance the investigatory or preparatory
services that may be required.3" In addition, many lawyers defending indigents under these systems are totally inexperienced in
(1961). See also N.Y. BAR COMM. STUDY 58-60; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC DEFENDERS 12-14 (1956); cf. FISHER, THE ART

OF DETECTION 29-53; Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The
Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 250-51
(1962); Address by Judge Frank, 15 F.R.D. 93, 100 (1953); Note, 13 STAN.
L. REV. 522, 557-59 (1961).
34. Harris B. Steinberg, quoted in ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE PROBLEM OF A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 5

(1961).

35. Federal Rule 16 provides for discovery only by the defendant and
only against the Government. Material to be thus obtained is limited to
documents or other objects "obtained from or belonging to the defendant
or obtained from others by seizure or by process." FED. R. CRMI. P.
16.
36. See ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
THE PROBLEM OF DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES (1961); Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L. 1149, 1180-92 (1960); Developments in the La--Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1051-63 (1961); Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE LJ. 626, 633-40 (1951).
The substantial problems facing the indigent defendant in securing information to prepare his defense caused a special committee of the New
York Bar Association to include as one of the six standards of primary
significance in an adequate defender system a provision for the "investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense." N.Y. BAR
CoMm. STUDY 26.
mhe innocent defendant suffers most from (the lack of discovery] procedure. The guilty defendant may not need liberal discovery
procedures. He usually knows the identity of the witnesses ....

what

they have told the grand jury and what they will tell the trial
jury. .

.

. An innocent defendant, on the other hand, may well be

unaware of the identity of the witnesses against him. He has no way
of knowing what false or misleading testimony has produced the unfounded charge against him.
WILLIAMS, ONE MAN'S FREEDOM 167-68 (1962).
37. See, e.g., BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note

21, at 123-46; N.Y.
BAR COMM. STUDY 34-53; Callagy, Legal Aid in Criminal Cases, 42
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 589, 593-607 (1952); Trebach, supra note 25;
Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 20, at 556-66; Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
832, 835-37 (1958); Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 596-600 (1963).
38. N.Y. BAR COMM. STUDY 62-72; Pollock, supra note 12, at 741-

48. According to Mr. Justice Clark, the problems facing assigned coun-

1062

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1054

handling criminal cases. 9 While public defender systems may
be the solution to the problem of inexperienced counsel, they are
also plagued by a scarcity of funds.4" Since the present systems
are inadequate, they will be able to provide indigents with little
aid in addition to counsel.
Federal courts have, at present, no provision even for payment
of court-appointed counsel for indigents, although such legislation
has been introduced in Congress."' Some assistance in securing
witnesses is given by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 17(b) instructs the court, upon a showing of poverty and
that the expected testimony is material, to subpoena witnesses for
the defendant and to direct the Government to pay the costs and
the witness fee. The availability of this assistance is within the
discretion of the trial court and is not reviewable.42 Both the
showing required to invoke the rule and the discretion of the
trial court in granting the assistance, however, limit the value of
this rule to the defendant. Rule 28 provides for the appointment,
at the discretion of the court, of an impartial expert witness. This
rule has been unsuccessfully attacked as unconstitutional because
it requires the expert to "advise the parties of his findings,"
subjecting the defendant to discovery proceedings on behalf of the
Government and in effect compelling him to testify against himself.43 Neither of these rules provides financial assistance for investigation or preparation of the defense.
In state and local jurisdictions, the amount of assistance varies with the type of legal aid offered. In states having only assel systems can be expected "to reach almost insurmountable" proportions because of recent decisions expanding the right to counsel. Clark,
Utopia and Tomorrow's Lawyer, Student Lawyer, June 1963, p. 5, 8;
accord, Address by Chief Justice Knutson of the Minnesota Supreme
Court to the Ramsey County Bar Association, March 27, 1963, in Minn.
Bench & B., May 1963, p. 11, at 16.
39. N.Y. BAR COMM. STUDY 65; Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 58283 (1963).
40. N.Y. BAR COMM. STUDY 73-74; Pollock, supra note 12, at 749
-52.
41. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. For an excellent description and analysis of weaknesses of the assigned counsel system in federal
courts, see Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in
the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 596-600 (1963).

42. Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70 (1895); Gibson v. United
States, 53 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1931); see COMMITTEE ON POVERTY 27.
43. See United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158, 166 (E.D. Wis.
1955), rev'd, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
The Attorney General's Committee concluded that Rule 28 is not well
adapted to the purpose of supplying needed expert witnesses. COMMITTEE
ON POVERTY 27.
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signed counsel systems of representation, the accused is entirely

dependent on the willingness and ability of the assigned counsel
to engage in investigation and to secure experts to assist in preparation or presentation of the defense." While those jurisdictions with voluntary defender organizations may theoretically finance all aid necessary to the defense from whatever donated
funds are available, in practice there are likely to be few funds
available for such services." Public defender systems vary widely

in the amount of funds each has available, but they generally fail
to provide sufficient funds to conduct adequate investigation, preparation, and presentation of the accused's case." The only other
means of assistance available to the accused is the prosecutor, and
he is unlikely to be a fruitful source."
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR A RIGHT TO

II.

AID IN ADDITION TO COUNSEL

A.

THE SUPREmE CoURT AND POVERTY

The Supreme Court has spoken only rarely of the significance
of poverty in the judicial process, stating that poverty is "constitutionally an irrelevance"'---that is, indigence is a basis
44.
The failure of the practices prevailing in all the district courts outside
the District of Columbia to provide assigned counsel with Tesources to
contest the guilt of defendant or violations of his constitutional rights
is, in the judgment of the Committee, a fundamental deficiency of the
present system. We believe that the consequences are serious and unfortunate. First, in some cases assigned counsel is induced to advise a
plea of guilty because he is aware that resources adequate to challenge abuse of authority or the government's accusation are lacking.
Second, when a decision is made to go to trial, the absence of such resources handicaps conduct of the defense and places the accused at a
disadvantage not shared by the defendant in possession of adequate
means. It is not possible to determine the percentage of cases in which
these deficiencies reach serious proportions. It is clear, however, that
the impact on the individual defendant is devastating when it does occur
and that no system of representation worthy of the name can complacently tolerate such consequences.
COMMrrE ON POVERTY 26. For appraisals of the burden on assigned
counsels, see N.Y. BAR COMM. STUDY 66; CommrrrEE oN POVERTY 29-30.
45. Id. at 70-71.
46. See note 37 supra.
47.
Without a discovery process, without investigatory facilities, the assigned counsel must take crumbs of information from the prosecution's
table. It goes without saying that the "crumbs" usually doled out by the
prosecution are those which give the defendant's case a guilty and
hopeless flavor.
Trebach, supra note 25, at 303. See also FRANK, NOT GUILTY 154-55

(1957).
48. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941).
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neither for asserting rights nor for denying them. This pronouncement, however, is not very helpful. Certainly it cannot mean that
the Court will ignore the fact of the defendant's indigence and
the resulting problems he faces in securing aid at trial' and
on appeal.5" For these purposes, his poverty is indeed relevant; it
casts upon the state some affirmative duty to ensure the defendant the aid he needs in conducting his defense.
Whether a constitutional right to aid in addition to counsel may
be premised upon the poverty of the defendant is a question that
is largely unexplored. 5 The Supreme Court in United States ex
rel. Smith v. Baldi52 had occasion to consider this question,
but gave it only perfunctory attention. The defendant in Smith
had been convicted of murder by a Pennsylvania court. The trial
court had appointed a psychiatrist to examine the defendant
and to testify as an impartial witness. The defendant alleged,
however, that the state was required to appoint a psychiatrist to
make a pretrial examination to determine his sanity. The Court,
three justices dissenting, concluded that it could not "say that the
State has that duty by constitutional mandate . . . . Psychiatrists
testified. That suffices. ' 3
In reaching this result, the Court relied on McGarty v. O'Brien,"
decided in 1951 by the First Circuit. In McGarty, the defendant
argued that the refusal of the trial court to appoint a psychiatrist
to examine him and to testify as a defense witness violated due
process. While the court in a unanimous decision rejected this contention, it based its decision on the narrow ground that the state
had in fact provided two impartial psychiatrists whose reports had
been made available to the defense.' This court did not decide
the broader constitutional question; it pointed out that "how
far the state . . . is required under the due process clause to minimize this disadvantage [of poverty] is a matter which, in other contexts, may deserve serious examination."' '
The defendant in both Smith and McGarty did have the assistance of state-appointed psychiatrists. Whether either court
49. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
50. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
51. See generally Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957).
52. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).

53. Id. at 568.
54. 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951).

55. The defendant did not utilize the doctors' report at the trial because they had concluded that he was "neither feeble minded nor insane,
and that he does know the difference between right and wrong." 188
F.2d at 152.
56. Id. at 155.
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would have reached the same result had no psychiatrists been
available is unclear. Thus, neither case forecloses the question of
whether an indigent defendant is entitled to aid in addition to
counsel. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Texas" suggests that the Court is not committed to Smith as foreclosing the question of the indigent defendant's right to aid in addition to counsel.5s
B.

ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO AID IN ADDITION TO COUNSEL

Several reasonable arguments can be advanced in support of
an indigent defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of
the state in preparing and presenting his defense.
1.

Aid and the Adversary Process

Such aid would often seem to be necessary for the proper functioning of the adversary process. Although it may occasionally
be forgotten in the heat of trial, the adversary process is employed
because it is deemed the most effective method of discovering
truth. The theory underlying the adversary system is that truth
is most likely to be disclosed when each litigant has freedom to
discover and present those materials that will support his case
and undermine his adversary's. 59 But the adversary system also
presupposes that truth will emerge only if the "parties are roughly
comparable in legal, investigative, and expert resources. The system will not function well if they are not. . . . Substantial equal-

ity is certainly a minimal condition in a procedural system oriented
towards -afair trial.""0
57. 372 U.S. 586 (1963). In Bush, the defendant claimed a constitutional right to the assistance of a state-appointed psychiatrist, but the Court
"'declined to anticipate a question of constitutional law,' " and disposed
of the case on other grounds. Id. at 590.
58. Counsel for petitioner in Bush argued persuasively that Smith
and McGarty actually support the right of an indigent defendant to the

assistance of a psychiatrist, for in both cases the courts rejected the de-

fendants' appeals solely because psychiatrists had examined the defendants.
The Smith and McGarty cases suggest, as a minimum compulsion
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, that in a case where

insanity is seriously in issue, the state must make available testimony
by competent psychiatrists ....
Brief for Petitioner, p. 34, Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963).

59. See MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 3 (1956).
60. Goldstein & Fine, supra note 32, at 1062-63. "[MIf society desires
that courts engage in a search for truth, before punishing, then I would
avoid -being singy with defense materials." United States v. Brodon, 241

F.2d 107, 115 (7th Cir. 1957) (Finnegan, I., dissenting); see ALI-ABA

JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE PROBLEM OF A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE 2, 33-35 (1961); Cuff, supra note 12, at 720-22.
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Recently, the Court has expressed similar concern with the consequences of poverty in the adversary process. In Griffin v. Illinois,6 for example, the Court stated that "there can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has"; 6 2 in Douglas v. California,3 the Court deplored the "discrimination . . . between cases where the rich
man can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot.""4
2.

A PeculiarScale of Priorities

If the indigent defendant needs aid in addition to counsel to conduct an adequate defense under the adversary system, then such
aid ought to be considered more important than many other defendant's rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This is not the
case. For example, defendants are shielded from convictions obtained through illegally-secured evidence, not because of the occasional untrustworthiness of that evidence, but because of a desire to curb improper police methods of obtaining evidence. 5 In
contrast, when the accused is refused the aid that he may require to prepare or present a defense, the trustworthiness of the
guilt-determining process is impaired. It is a somewhat peculiar
scale of values that protects a defendant when the evidence used to
convict him is trustworthy, and yet does not attempt to prevent a
conviction that may be untrustworthy because of the accused's inability to afford the costs of a proper defense.
5 and Douglas
Griffin v. Illinois"
v. California"" furnish a second example of this peculiar scale of priorities. In Griffin, the
Court held that a state could not deny an indigent defendant the
right to obtain appellate review of alleged trial errors solely because of his inability to pay the cost of the required trial transcript. Thus, the state is required to furnish the indigent at least
this one "tool" essential for a meaningful appeal. Douglas placed
a second "tool" at the disposal of the indigent defendant in making
61. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62. Id. at 19.
63. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

64. Id. at 357.

65. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952). For a particularly forceful statement of the need to
return to "first principles," see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of

an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-8 (1962). See also Kadish, Methodol-

ogy and Criteria for Due Process Adludicatlon-A Survey and Criticism,
66 YALE L.J. 319, 346 (1957); Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 51, at 24.
66. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

67. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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his appeal effective by requiring that the state provide counsel on
at least the first appeal when the state makes such appeal a matter of right. That such aids are guaranteed on appeal while there
is no constitutional right to appeal and while no similar provision
for aid exists at the trial level is somewhat anomalous.8 Certainly
enabling the accused to present his defense effectively at the trial
level should be more important than granting him various forms
of aid on appeal.
3.

The EqualProtectionClause

Griffin v. Illinois9 and its progeny furnish some support for a
constitutional right based on the equal protection clause to aid
other than counsel. Some scholars have contended that the significance of Griffin is that for the first time the Court "addressed
itself squarely to the impact of poverty on constitutional
rights under the due process and equal protection clauses .... ",,0
But Griffin can be, and has been, read much more narrowlyit is a denial of equal protection for a state to condition availability of appellate review of alleged trial errors solely on the defendant's ability to furnish a transcript.7' Under this reading, the
equal protection clause is the proper basis for Griffin; the holding
is limited to the narrow problem of denial of access to the court
solely because of economic disability.
2 was decided this term, the cases
Until Douglas v. California7
following Griffin could be harmonized with this interpretation. In
Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 73 the Court held that a state
could not make the availability of a free transcript for an indigent
defendant's appeal dependent upon the trial judge's determination
of whether there was reversible error. Such a method of aiding
indigents would not provide them with a right of appellate review
equivalent to the right of review enjoyed by a defendant who can
pay for his own transcript. 74 The Court in Burns v. Ohio5 further
held that a state may not require an indigent defendant to pay a
68. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Florida

Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 51, at 24.
69. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
70. Willcox & Bloustein, supranote 51, at 1-2.
71. See, e.g., Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right
to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICE. L. REv. 219, 246-54 (1962);
Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CH. L. REV. 143, 146 (1957); Comment,

55 MIcH. L. REv. 413, 420 (1957).
72. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

73. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
74. Id. at 216.
75. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
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filing fee before allowing him to file a motion for leave to appeal;
in Smith v. Bennett, 76 the Court decided that a state may not condition the docketing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
the payment of a filing fee. In each case, the defendant, because of
poverty, was unable to fulfill the requirement demanded as a condition to meaningful review. These decisions thus appeared to establish that a state, having provided a "road," appellate review,
could not deny access to that road solely because of poverty."'
This interpretation of Griffin, however, is no longer satisfactory, for in Douglas, the Court read Griffin as more than an access case. The defendant in Douglas had access to the appellate
court; he was simply required to present bis appeal personally.
The Court required that counsel be appointed for the defendant,
reasoning that when a state allowed appeals as of right, "the type
of appeal a person is afforded" cannot "hinge upon whether or
not he can pay for the assistance of counsel.""3 As in Griffin, the
Court in Douglas appeared to rely on both due process and equal
protection in reaching this result.79 The Griffin-Douglas doctrine,
therefore, appears to demand more than that the state simply place
the defendant upon the "road"; it must see that he has some vehicle--counsel-to use in traveling the "road."
In rejecting the "access" interpretation of Griffin, the Court has
selected a difficult course, for if Griffin had been limited to "access," a clear line would exist by which states and he Court could
determine what aid was due an indigent defendant on appeal,
Nonetheless, the Court's holding is logically sound; the contrary
result-that aid must be given to a convicted appellant to gain
meaningful access, and yet aid need not be granted to the same
defendant who, having gained access, lacks the resouces to present an effective appeal-would have been anomalous.
In other respects, however, the Griffin-Douglas doctrine of aid
on appeal can be questioned. In Griffin, the Court had indicated
sympathy with the administrative and financial problems facing
states in aiding the indigent defendant on appeal, and had expressed a willingness to allow the states considerable discretion in
adopting "corrective rules to meet the problem. ' 80 Douglas
76.
77.
78.
79.

365 U.S. 708 (1961).
See Comment, 1959 DUKE L.J. 484, 486.
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
In dissenting to Douglas, Mr. Justice Harlan criticized the ma-

jority's reliance on both the equal protection and due process clauses.
Id. at 360-367.

80. 351 U.S. at 20.
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would appear to allow the states less leeway, however,8" for California had created such a rule-the appellate court should examine the record "and determine whether it would be of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have

counsel appointed."' '

A more puzzling aspect of the Douglas extension of Griffin
is that the Court, on the same day that it decided Douglas, overruled. the Betts v. Brady' "special cireumstances" limitation on
the indigent accused's right to counsel in state cases." In overruling Betts, the Court proceeded from the premise that counsel
was essential to a fair trial; in Douglas, the Court relied on an entirely different ground-an indigent defendant should get whatever aid the affluent man could have obtained to make his appeal
meaningful. To the extent that Douglas is based on equal protection and the equal protection clause demands the representation of counsel at appellate level, that clause would seem to require
such representation at trial level also. Douglas would then be an
a fortioribasis for overruling Betts."
If Griffin and Douglas do indeed represent such an extension
of the equal protection clause, then no logical barrier would appear to prevent the use of that clause either as a basis for representation of counsel at stages other than trial and first appeal or
as a basis for aid in addition to counsel. At least the GriffinDouglas doctrine would require a state to provide assistance at
trial level if that assistance were a sine qua non to presenting a
defense. If, for example, a statute required testimony of a psychiatrist to sustain an insanity plea, the state would be compelled to
pay the expense of obtaining such a witness."m
The most troublesome problem flowing from the Griffin-Douglas doctrine is in determining where to "draw the line,"87 and
81. Chief Justice Knutson of the Minnesota Supreme Court has drawn
a similar conclusion:
[A]s far as the appointment of counsel is concerned the court has
gone all the way and . .. it is now necessary to appoint counsel for
every indigent defendant convicted of a crime who wishes to perfect

an appeal. There is only one step left, and that is to hold that counsel

must also be appointed in all post-conviction applications ...
Address to the Ramsey County Bar Association, March 27, 1963, in Minn.
Bench & B., May 1963, p. 11, 12.
82. People v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958).
83. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
84. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
85. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 219, 250 (1962).
87. See id. at 260.
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it is here that this doctrine breaks down. If the standard is that
the state must "furnish [the indigent defendant] with legal services . . . equivalent to those that the affluent defendant can obtain,"88 then no logical limitation exists short of substantial equality. There is no apparent distinction between providing witnesses
and paying for investigation and preparation, or between providing counsel at trial, on first appeal, on discretionary appeal,
and on petition for certiorari.8 9 This extension is far from the
traditional purpose of the equal protection clause, which historically has served to prevent discrimination in statutes that were
primarily intended to be discriminatory,90 or that created classifications with no legitimate purpose.' The Griffin-Douglas standard under an equal protection reading, however, appears to require a state to alleviate inequities even when they are not caused
by discriminatory policies, and it offers no ascertainable, logical
basis for limiting the duty of the state to minimize inequities.
4.

The Due ProcessClause

The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
are perhaps more reasonable grounds on which to interpret
Griffin and its progeny, and on which to base a constitutional
right to aid in addition to counsel. The due process clause, according to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, is "the least frozen concept of
our law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive of
powerful social standards of a progressive society.'"'" As our
civilization advances, our notions of due process and fundamental fairness may be enlarged or altered. Police methods that
were considered fair in one era begin to pain the conscience of an
advancing society; the fairness of guilt-determining procedures,
which may be maintained easily in a relatively uncomplicated le88. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
89. The Second Circuit has recently ruled that a state is not required
to furnish counsel to an indigent defendant in preparing an application
for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. United States ex rel. Coleman
v. Denno, 313 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1963). The defendant had been provided
counsel in carrying his appeal through the New York appellate system;
the court regarded the furnishing of counsel at all such stages as
sufficient to satisfy the Griffin-Douglasrequirement.
dissenting).

90. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Truax
v. Raech, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).

91. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535

(1942). See generally Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of
"Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131
(1950); Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949).
92. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956).
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gal process, may be impaired as the process becomes more complex. Thus, due process expands to include "those procedures that
are fair 93
and feasible in the light of then existing values and capabilities.
The "fundamental fairness" standard of due process" would
seem to be readily adaptable to at least some situations in which the
indigent accused needs aid in addition to counsel. Due process
protection was, in fact, sought in the three recent federal cases
in which this constitutional right was asserted. In McGarty v.
O'Brien,9 5 the First Circuit avoided the constitutional issue although it admitted that the due process contention was not untenable.96 In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,97 four judges
of the Third Circuit rejected the due process argument, while the
three dissenters contended that the aid of a psychiatrist was de9 the
manded by due process. 98 In United States v. Brodson,"
trial court held that the guarantees of due process and right to
counsel required that the defendant have the assistance of an accountant in preparing his defense. Because the defendant's assets had been impounded and subjected to tax liens, he was unable
to pay for such assistance, and the trial court dismissed the action
in the belief that the defendant would be deprived of a fair trial.
A majority of the Seventh Circuit reversed without considering the
constitutional issue. Two dissenters, however, agreed with the trial
court that due process demanded the furnishing of an accountant
in this situation' 0 0 Thus, five of the nine judges on the federal
courts of appeal who have considered this due process question on the merits (and the district court judge in Brodson) were
prepared to hold that aid in addition to counsel is constitutionally required at the trial level.' 0 '
93. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.

REV. 1, 10 (1956).

94. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

95. 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951).

96. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.

97. 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), affd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
98. The Supreme Court, however, appeared to leave open this constitutional question. See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
99. 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 241

F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957).

100. 241 F.2d at 111, 112.

101. The nine judges who considered the question on the merits were
the two dissenters in Brodson, the three dissenters in Smith (all five of
whom favored the due process argument), and the four judges in the ma-

jority in Smith. Neither the unanimous court in McGarty nor the majority
in Brodson reached the constitutional issue.
In dissenting in Smith, Mr. Justice Frankfurter appeared to agree with
these five judges.
A denial of adequate opportunity to sustain the plea of insanity is a
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Griffin and succeeding cases can perhaps best be understood by
reference to the principles of due process, for all of these cases
involve the "fundamental fairness" value with which due process
is concerned. They are most reasonably read to establish that when
a state provides for appeals, it is unfair to deny the indigent defendant some aids-those aids without which his appeal has little
chance of being meaningful. Some discriminations based on
wealth produce such great disparity in effectiveness that they are
fundamentally unfair, thus violating due process. Only if it is said
that it is unfair to deny the indigent any form of assistance that
a rich man may obtain is the equal protection concept introduced. In the Griffin-Douglas line of cases, the extent of inequality
between indigent defendants and defendants of means was so vast
and so significant in the appellate process as to be unfair.'
The significance of the Griffin-Douglas doctrine, therefore, is that
it incorporates within the due process standard some element of
equality, but this is not to say that every inequality violates due
process. Through the use of the due process standard, distinctions
that are both fair to the defendant and feasible with respect to the
abilities of the states0 . may be made to determine what aid is
required, and at what stages in the legal process it is required.
5.

The Right to Counsel Guarantee

Aid for indigents in addition to counsel may also be premised
on the guarantee of the sixth amendment that "in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."'0 4 The Court has held that this right guarantees the effective assistance of counsel.'
If the word "assistance" in the sixth amendment is stressed, then the amendment
could be construed to guarantee more than the representation of
counsel. 6 In support of such a construction, some have contended that aid in investigation or in procuring witnesses may be more
denial of the safeguard of due process in its historical procedural sense
which is in the incontrovertible scope of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 571 (1953).
102. See notes 73-79 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Schaefer, supra note 93 at 6.
104. See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 115 (7th Cir. 1957);
United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956).
105. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948).
106. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 36-37, Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586
(1963); Ex parte Ochse, 38 Cal. 2d 230, 231, 238 P.2d 561 (1951). See
also United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1957) (Finnegan, J., dissenting).
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Use of this standard, of
important than the aid of counsel.'
course, involves the same problems in determining the scope of the
right as do the use of the due process and equal protection
clauses1 0 8 The determination of what "assistance" is essential to
make counsel effective depends on whether the standard is one of

"fundamental fairness" or of achieving substantial equality between

indigent and affluent defendants. 109

In summary, while no attempt to establish a constitutional right
to aid other than counsel has secured majority acceptance in any
court that has considered the issue, there is substantial judicial opinion favoring the recognition of such a right. Moreover, those courts
that have refused to import such a right into the Constitution
made their decisions on narrow grounds in factual situations
that did not present the constitutional question squarely on the
merits. Finally, in light of the Court's decisions in the GriffinDouglas line of cases, a constitutional right to aid in addition to
counsel appears readily inferrable from either the equal protection clause or the due process clause although either basis offers
obstacles in determining the scope of the right.
IlI.

DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN PROVIDING AID IN
ADDITION TO COUNSEL

A.

DETERMINING INDIGENCY

The threshold problem of how indigency is to be determined
has been the subject of much comment." 0 False indigency
107. Cross, "The Assistance of Counsel for His Defence": Is This Becoming a Meaningless Guarantee?, 38 A.B.A.J. 995, 996 (1952).
108. See Kamisar, Belts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 220-23 (1962).
109. Historically, of course, the guarantee of counsel meant only that
the state could not prevent the accused from using counsel in his
defense if he chose to employ one. See generally BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-33 (1955). However, since the Court has,
for the past 30 years, consistently interpreted the amendment as requiring the representation of counsel, at least in some cases the original intent would not appear to be a significant barrier to construing the amendment to include that aid necessary to make counsel effective. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
110. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,

PUBLIC DE-

FENDERS 8-11 (1956); Prettyman, Three Modern Problems in Criminal
Law, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187, 212-13 (1961); Willcox & Bloustein, Account of a Field Study in a Rural Area of the Representation
of Indigents Accused of Crime, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 565-66 (1959);
Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal
District Courts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 579-80 (1963); Note, Representation
of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public Defender and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522, 545 (1961).
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claims are difficult to discover without investigation, yet any substantial investigation is likely to be more costly than simply allowing the claim."' In jurisdictions without public defender systems, no person, including the judge, is sufficiently informed
1 12
of the defendant's financial status to make the determination.
Even if the defendant's financial condition could be easily discovered, the question of whether he is "indigent" remains. This term
defies precise definition. Certainly it cannot be based on a stated
minimum dollar amount of assets." 3 "Medical indigency" exists
when a patient is without sufficient funds to pay the expenses incident to his particular illness." 4 By analogy, indigency for legal purposes should not depend on a fixed standard,"' such
as whether the defendant has been able to provide bail, but
should be determined on the basis of the adequacy of the defendant's resources when measured against the complexity of the issues
and the necessity for investigation and expert assistance.

B.

FORMS OF

AID

The kinds of aid to which an indigent defendant may be entitled depends on whether the constitutional basis is the equal
protection clause or the due process clause. Equal protection, as
applied in Douglas, would seem to guarantee all aid necessary to
place the indigent defendant in substantial equality with the defendant of means. If, on the other hand, equality is deemed to be
an ingredient of due process, it is possible to distinguish between
those forms of aid that are more essential and those that are less
essential to "fundamental fairness." The state would be required
to the extent of its existing capabilities, to minimize inequities in
forms of aid that are more essential than others in achieving "fundamental fairness." Applying such a standard, the assistance of
counsel on first appeal, in which the incidence of reversal is
from 12 percent to 30 percent," 6 would be more essential to
achieving fairness than would the same assistance on the second
appeal or on a petition for certiorari;".. beyond the first appeal,
111. See Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 580 (1963).
112. See id. at 580, 585-86; Note, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522, 546 (1961).

113. Prettyman, supra note 110, at 212; Note, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522,
545-47 (1961).

114. See Meerman & Long, Aid for the Medically Indigent, 16 VAND.
L. REV. 173, 174-75, 181 (1963).
115. See COMMITTEE ON POVERTY 7-8, 40-41; Note, 76 HARV. L. REV.

579, 587 (1963); Note, Legal Aid to Indigent Criminal Defendants in Philadelphia and New Jersey, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 812, 833 (1959). But cf.
Prettyman, supra note 110, at 213.
116. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 21-25, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
117. See note 89 supra.
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counsel would appear less vital both because the incidence of reversal is presumably less and because the courts to which such
later appeals are addressed are probably already aware of the
broad policy questions that the cases usually pose. By the same
reasoning, counsel on appeal may be less important than such
other forms of aid as investigatory services and witnesses at the
trial level. Distinctions may even be drawn among the types of
aid other than counsel at the trial level. Arguably, aid in investigation is more useful than is assistance in securing witnesses. 8
Among witnesses, aid in securing key missing witnesses might be
considered more important than providing expert witnesses; among
expert witnesses, the need for psychiatrists may be most pressing
because of complexity of the insanity issue 9 and the frequency
with which it arises.
Under this analysis, both the type of aid typically secured by
defendants of means in similar cases and the amount being expended on the case by the prosecution 12 1 might be viewed as
evidentiary facts to be weighed in determining whether the proceeding is likely to fulfill the due process requirement of "fairness." Equality between indigents and defendants of means would
not then be the sole factor in determining what aid must be given;
inequality is not relevant unless it is likely to make a significant
difference in the reliability of the legal process. To the extent of
its capabilities, a state would be required to minimize those inequities that may significantly affect reliability. Because the limited resources of the states will make them unable to eliminate
inequality, some scale of priorities between the forms of assistance
may be necessary.
C.

CAsEs IN WHICH AID MAY BE REQUIRED

Several choices are possible in identifying the kinds of cases to
which the right to aid extends. One alternative is to make the availability of aid co-extensive with the right to counsel; whenever the
indigent may demand the assistance of counsel, he must also be
furnished with other aid. Use of this standard, however, would
118. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
119. For an exhaustively documented and persuasive discussion of the

complexity of the insanity issue and the resulting need for a psychiatrist,
see Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-17, Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963).

120. Some states appear to recognize that the amount being expended
on the case by the prosecution is a relevant criterion for determining
what aid ought to be furnished the defendant. In New York, for example, the court may direct the employment of as many expert witnesses
for the indigent defendant as the prosecution employs. N.Y. CODE CRMI.
PROC. § 308.
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create a dilemma. The greater the number of cases to which the
right to counsel is extended, the greater will be the financial
burden on the state if it is also forced to provide other aid. Thus,
to the extent that aid other than counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the expansion of right to counsel may be impeded. If, on
the other hand, the right to counsel is further broadened both in
the kinds of cases and in the stages in the judicial process to which
it extends, then aid other than counsel may be narrowly restricted
because of the financial limitations of the states.'
A second alternative is to make the availability of aid in addition to counsel depend on the seriousness of the charge or on the
severity of the possible punishment. Such a limitation may be a
practical one, but there is no logical relationship between the
severity of the offense or the punishment and the need for this aid.
The issues in a tax case 22 may be more complex and may require
more assistance than a murder case. Perhaps a more reasonable alternative is to condition the right to aid on the complexity of
the case and the peculiar circumstances of the defendant.' 23
D.

DETERMINING THE NEED FOR AID

Also of importance in the application of the right to aid other
121. What the cost of providing this aid to indigent defendants would
be is a matter of almost pure speculation. The cost would depend on the
kind and number of cases to which the right would extend and on the
amount of aid found to be necessary. This, in turn, would depend on
whether the constitutional standard is one of "fundamental fairness" or
of "providing the defendant with the kind of trial that would be available
to the man of means"; the latter standard would appear to place a considerable financial burden on the state. The present cost per case of providing counsel in public defender systems is relatively low-less than $100
per case. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC DEFENDERS 39,
chart 2 (1956).
The problem of financing aid to indigents can perhaps best be solved by
use of public defender systems. It has been estimated that an annual expenditure of $225,000 would be necessary to finance a model defender system in the District of Columbia. BAR Ass'N OF D.C., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LEGAL AID 179-87 (1958). An expenditure of $180,000 would
be required for a comparable system in New Jersey. Trebach, supra note 25,
at 309. Some argue that such expenditures are not unreasonable in a
society that appropriates much greater amounts for other types of public
assistance. See Prettyman, supra note 110, at 207-08. The problem of cost
may itself encourage the expansion of public defender systems since these
systems are more efficient and less costly than assigned counsel systems.
Goldstein, Book Review, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 772-73 (1961).
122. Cf. United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955),
rev'd, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957).
123. "The appointment of counsel for a deaf mute would not constitute due process of law unless an interpreter also was available." United
States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 559 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting
opinion), afI'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
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than counsel is the identification of who is to decide whether, and
how much, aid must be furnished. Obviously, this decision is
not one that the accused himself can properly make. Indeed, the
requirement of counsel is predicated upon the assumption that an
accused does not have the knowledge necessary to analyze his own
124
defense.
Public defender organizations, where they exist, would appear
to be competent bodies to make this decision because their staffs
are presumably experienced in conducting criminal defenses and
because they are aware of the practical limits on the resources
available to them. For this reason, the decision of the public defender, both on the merits of the request for aid and of the capacity of the state to provide aid, should probably be subject to review only for abuse of discretion."x Establishment of a right to
aid other than counsel would thus militate in favor of the further
development of public defender systems as offering the most efficient method by which a state could administer such a right.
In jurisdictions having assigned counsel or private defender
systems, the decision of whether aid in addition to counsel is necessary might be made by the trial judge or, more reasonably, by
the defense attorney. The desire of the attorney to maintain his
rapport with the court should prevent excessive demands for aid.
CONCLUSION
The factual premise of this Note has been that various forms
of aid are often as important to an indigent defendant as the representation of counsel, and that these aids are too frequently unavailable to the indigent. If aid other than counsel is essential to
secure reliability in the guilt-determining process, one or more
clauses of the Constitution would seem to require that such aid be
guaranteed. A logical extension of the Court's position in Griffin
and Douglas would seem to indicate that the equal protection
clause may demand the granting of aid other than counsel at
trial level. Alternatively, either the due process clause or the guarantee of counsel can reasonably be read to require that such aid be
furnished to indigents.
124. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
125. But cf. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), where the Supreme

Court held that the requirements of the fourteenth amendment were not

satisfied by a procedure that allowed the public defender to decide
whether a transcript to be used on appeal should be furnished to an indigent defendant. Such a procedure might be satisfactory, however, if the
discretion of the public defender were reviewable. See id. at 485 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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The difficult task is in "drawing the line," a task of at least threedimensional proportion. The scope of the right to aid other than
counsel involves determinations of (1) the cases in which aid must
be granted; (2) the kinds of aid that must be furnished; and (3)
the stages at which aid is required. If a due process standard is
adopted, the kinds of cases in which aid is required and the kinds
of aid to be granted should be determined by analysis of the
complexity of the particular case and by a judgment as to whether
the defendant is likely to be able to present a meaningful defense
without the aid requested. Awareness of what the prosecution is
expending on the case and what defendants of means typically
spend in like cases would be useful in weighing the reasonableness
of the defendant's request for aid.
Establishing a limitation on the stages in the legal process to
which the right to aid other than counsel extends should be resolved by considering the extent to which inequities between indigents and defendants of means need to be minimized to achieve
reliability in the guilt-determining process; presumably the inequities would need to be minimized only at those stages in which
they make a significant difference in the disposition of the case.
Because of the limited capabilities of the states to furnish assistance
to indigents, a problem intensified by the expansion of the right to
counsel itself, a choice will have to be made as to which inequities it is most important to minimize.

